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The practical interpretation  
of the categorical  
imperative: a defense*
1Defensa de la interpretación  




The article compares two different interpretations of Kant’s categorical imperative 
−the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is 
superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of 
coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the 
undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the 
desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that 
neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that 
sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpre-
tation should be rejected.
Keywords: B. Herman, C. Korsgaard, I. Kant, O. O’Neill, categorical 
imperative.
Resumen
El artículo compara dos interpretaciones diferentes del imperativo categórico kan-
tiano −la práctica y la lógica− y defiende la superioridad de la práctica debido a que 
rechaza los casos de free riding, sin rechazar necesariamente los casos de coordi-
nación/tiempo. La interpretación lógica, en cambio, lleva al resultado indeseable 
de no rechazar casos inmorales de free riding, y al resultado deseable de rechazar 
las máximas de coordinación/tiempo. Dado que ninguna de las dos rechaza las 
máximas de coordinación/tiempo (y en este sentido son similares) y solamente la 
interpretación práctica rechaza los casos de free riding, debe rechazarse la inter-
pretación lógica.
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categórico.
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Interpreters of Kant have not reached a consensus, even today, on 
how to understand the Categorical Imperative. In this article, I would 
like to focus on one specific source of disagreement on that issue: how 
free riding and coordination/timing cases relate to each of the main 
interpretations of the categorical imperative –the practical and the 
logical one. According to Herman (cf. 1993), the practical interpreta-
tion is weaker than the logical one, because it fails to distinguish cases 
of free riding from cases of coordination/timing. As a consequence 
of that, she claims, it ends up rejecting cases that are obviously not 
impermissibile. I shall argue in this paper that Herman’s position is 
misleading, for it fails to acknowledge that a) the practical interpreta-
tion does not necessarily reject cases of coordination, as she suggests; 
and, more importantly, that b) the logical interpretation does not reject 
cases of real free riding –an undesirable outcome that the practical 
interpretation does not seem to have. In order to show this, I will argue 
that free riding cases, insofar as they could be considered instances 
of omissions, are different in nature from maxim/coordination cases.
Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative is:
Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law. (Kant, cited in Kosgaard 66)
Interpreters1 have understood this quote as meaning that what 
can be willed is a problem of what can be willed without contradic-
tion, after universalizing our maxims. This claim becomes clear when 
we read the following paragraph:
Some actions are of such a nature that their maxim cannot even be 
thought as a universal law of nature without contradiction, far from it 
being possible that one could will that it should be such. In others this 
internal impossibility is not found, though it is still impossible to will 
that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, 
because such a will would contradict itself. We easily see that the former 
maxim conflicts with the stricter or narrower (imprescriptible) duty, the 
latter with broader (meritorious duty). (Kant, cited in Korsgaard 25) 
According to Korsgaard (cf. 1985) (and, it seems, to the major-
ity of Kant’s interpreters), the first of these contradictions is usually 
called ‘contradiction in conception’, and the second ‘contradiction in 
the will’. There are three possible senses in which there could be a 
contradiction in conception (i.e. a contradiction in the maxim itself): 
the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction 
Interpretation, and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In 
this paper I would like to focus on the first two.
1 For example Korsgaard, Herman, Wood et al.
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On the Logical Contradiction Interpretation (LCI, from now on), 
a logical impossibility arises as a consequence of universalizing the 
maxim. In other words, the proposed universalized action would be 
unconceivable if universalized. The typical example of this kind of 
contradiction is the man who asks for a loan and (falsely) promises to 
repay it. To universalize the maxim of his action would lead to a world 
in which there would be no promises at all, because everybody would 
violate the practice of promising. 
On the Practical Contradiction Interpretation, the maxim of an 
individual would be self defeated if universalized. In other words, the 
purpose of the individuals’ action would conflict with itself. The same 
example as in the LCI could be considered, but under a different per-
spective. If somebody makes a false promise in order to obtain a loan, 
the contradiction would arise not from the fact that the universalized 
action (the practice of promising) would be unconceivable, but from 
the fact that the end of the person who makes false promises will be 
frustrated. As Kant says, the person “would make the promise itself 
and the end to be accomplished by it impossible” (66).
Korsgaard argues that the PCI deals with potential problems 
better than the other two. And it is precisely this claim that Barbara 
Herman wants to challenge. According to her, in “The Practice of 
Moral Judgment”, Ch. 7, the LCI is stronger than the PCI. Although 
she admits that the logical interpretation also has some problems, she 
seems to suggest that these problems are not as serious as the prob-
lems that the practical interpretation has. What are, according to 
Herman, the problems of the practical interpretation? An issue that 
Korsgaard seems to have overlooked, she suggests, is that the practi-
cal interpretation fails to distinguish free riding from what she calls 
‘coordination’ and ‘timing’. In other words, her charge is that if it is 
correct that actions are impermissible when the universalization of 
a maxim conflicts with the purpose of the action, then we should 
consider impermissible not only cases of free riding, but also cases of 
coordination and timing. Herman offers two examples of coordina-
tion and timing to clarify what they are (cf. Herman 138):
1. A wants to save money by shopping in the after-Christmas sale. 
If everyone did this, then the after-Christmas sale would die (because 
the fact that there is an after-Christmas sale depends on the fact 
that most people buy things at a higher price before Christmas). If 
the after-Christmas dies, then the purpose of A would be frustrated, 
because he would not be able to buy presents which are for sale.
2. B wants to play tennis Sunday morning, when her neighbours 
are at church. At all other times the courts are crowded. If everybody 
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acted as B does, the courts would be crowded at all times and the 
original purpose of playing tennis would be frustrated.
Case 1 is a case of coordination, and case 2 is a case of timing. In 
these two examples the agent takes advantage of the fact that others 
behave in ways that he or she is not behaving. Presents are cheap in 
the sale precisely because nobody buys them, and the tennis court is 
empty because everybody is at the church at that time. What Herman 
wants to show –if I understand her position correctly– is that these 
examples are not intuitively impermissible (it is far-fetched to think 
that A and B did something wrong), and yet they would be rejected by 
the practical interpretation. The reason is that in both cases the agents 
would frustrate their ends if the maxim of the action were univer-
salized. In this sense, Herman says, coordination and timing would 
be no different from free riding: in both cases there would be an 
impermissible action involved. So Herman seems to have found two 
counterexamples that show that the practical interpretation rejects 
actions which should not be rejected. From this and for other reasons 
–which I will not analyze here– she seems to suggest that the logical 
interpretation of the categorical imperative is stronger than the prac-
tical one. In fact, if we analyze these two cases under the perspective 
of the logical interpretation, we would not find any contradiction at 
all. The logical interpretation, as defined above, prescribes that actions 
are impermissible when their universalization is unconceivable. It is 
clearly not the case, however, that a world in which everybody would 
be playing tennis or shopping in the after-Christmas sale is uncon-
ceivable. The most we can say about this, as Herman puts is, is that it 
is “foolish” or “pointless” (139). 
I would like to argue that Herman’s criticisms are misleading, 
and that the counterexamples that she gives against the practical 
interpretation are not effective enough to debunk it. First, let us recall 
that Herman claims that the practical interpretation fails to distin-
guish between free riding cases and coordination or timing cases. 
Her objection, in other words, is that the practical interpretation puts 
free riding cases and maxims of coordination in the same bag, so to 
speak, and rejects both cases for the same reason. The assumption 
seems to be that the practical interpretation could, in some sense, be 
equally applied to free riding cases and coordination cases, in a way 
that would render both inadmissible, after applying the Categorical 
Imperative procedure. Moreover, her assumption seems to be that 
the practical interpretation would have to either consider them both 
inadmissible or both acceptable actions, as it is if formulated.
It is, however, implausible to claim that coordination and free 
riding cases could be considered similar –in a way that the result of 
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applying the Categorical Imperative to them would yield the same 
result– for they are cases which are different in nature.
In order to show in what sense omissions and coordination cases 
are different, let us consider the following examples: 
1. A lazy factory worker decides not to do his job, because he 
knows that the rest of the workers will do it for him anyway. 
2. A person overhears a guided tour in a museum, but did not pay 
for the tour.
What these two examples have in common, and in general all the 
cases of free riding, is that there is an omission involved. The lazy fac-
tory worker ‘does not’ do his job, even if he was expected to do so; and 
the person who overhears the tour in the museum ‘does not’ pay for 
it, even if he was expected to do so –if he wants to enjoy the benefits 
of the tour. 
If we take a look at the examples considered earlier (the after-
Christmas sale and the tennis court cases), we will hardly find an 
omission involved. On the contrary, the main feature in them is that 
the action involved is positive: to ‘go’ shopping, to ‘play’ tennis. 
If this difference between cases of free riding and coordination 
is real (i.e. if there are in fact omissions involved in one case but not 
in the other); then, unlike the cases of coordination, the cases of free 
riding could be considered instances of omissions. And omissions, 
needless to say, are better understood as practical contradictions than 
logical contradictions. The reason why the practical interpretation 
would better handle them is that it does not seem unconceivable to 
universalize a negative action that ought to be done (the most that 
can be said about a case like that is that the we would have a sad world 
in which nobody acts according to what it is expected of them). Of 
course, omissions and free riding cases are impermissible because 
there is a previous duty –i.e. previous to the omission– that the agent 
has, and that the agent does not fulfill. This previous duty, as every 
duty, is derived from the maxims. What theses maxims are is highly 
mysterious to me; but, in any case, that is the topic of another paper. 
The upshot of all this is that Herman’s claim that cases of coordi-
nation and free riding could be considered analogous or similar is 
misleading. The practical interpretation might possibly not resolve 
cases of coordination, but it would certainly solve cases of free riding.
On the other hand, it might be true that the logical interpreta-
tion does not reject cases of coordination, but it certainly does not 
reject real cases of free riding either (mainly because, as I said earlier, 
free riding cases are instances of omissions, which could be better 
handled by the practical interpretation). In fact, as Herman showed, 
the after-Christmas sale and the tennis court example would not be 
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unconceivable if universalized (the most we could say about them is 
that they are foolish). However, we would find a similar result if we 
analyze a free riding case: it would not be unconceivable to universal-
ize, say, example 1. The result would be just that workers do not do 
their job at all. 
So the partial conclusion of all this seems to be that, overall, the 
practical interpretation is stronger than the logical one, because it 
considers impermissible cases of real free riding –which is what we 
are mainly interested in rejecting– whereas the logical interpretation 
does not seem to consider them invalid. That alone should suffice to 
give a stronger weight to the practical interpretation, because to find a 
procedure that would reject real free riding cases seems more relevant 
than to find a procedure that would not reject cases of coordination. 
I hope all this becomes clear with the following table:
Coordination/timing Free riding (omissions)
Practical 
Interpretation Impermissible (Herman) Impermissible
Logical 
Interpretation Permissible Permissible
Under the logical interpretation coordination/timing cases 
are permissible, but free riding cases also are. Under the practical 
interpretation, free riding cases are impermissible and, according to 
Herman, coordination cases also are.
Although this would show that the practical interpretation 
is still stronger than the logical one, because an outcome in which 
real free riding cases get rejected is preferable over one in which free 
riding cases are considered permissible (regardless of how they deal 
with coordination examples); an issue that is worthwhile analyzing, 
anyway, is whether Herman is right in her claim that the practical 
interpretation would consider coordination/timing cases impermis-
sible. If she is not, then the remaining suspicions about the practical 
interpretation would be dissipated.
There is, I believe, a possible alternative way to understand coor-
dination/timing cases, which would show that Herman’s readings 
of them is implausible. Claims such as “I want to be the president 
of France”, “I want to be the national chess champion” or “I want 
to sit next to the exit door in an airplane, because it is safer” are all 
examples in which individuals want a special treatment for them. It 
would be impossible to achieve the ends that individuals claim to 
have, if everybody pursued them. And the cases that Herman offers as 
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counterexamples to the practical contradiction interpretation (going 
to the after-Christmas sale or using the tennis court when everybody 
is at the church) do not seem to me substantially different from these 
cases. They could also be grouped as examples in which individuals 
want a special treatment for them. But is there anything wrong with 
wanting to be a chess champion or a president? Obviously not. If these 
cases were, in fact, counterexamples, then the upshot of this is that 
almost every case in which somebody wanted to do something which 
is impossible to universalize would be incorrect: to want a promo-
tion in the working place, to book a room in a hotel, or even to eat 
bananas (assuming that there are not enough bananas in the world for 
everybody). Therefore, I believe that we should understand them in a 
rather different way (or else reject the whole idea of the Categorical 
Imperative as implausible). O’Neill (cf. 1989) has, in this sense, an 
interesting suggestion that could be relevant to discuss at this point. 
According to her, an agent’s maxim in a given act cannot be equated 
simply with intentions. If, for example, somebody makes a cup of cof-
fee for a new visitor, there would be many intentions involved in that 
action: the choice of the mug, the addition of the milk, the stirring, 
etc. But all these intentions would be secondary with respect to the 
underlying principle of the action: the maxim that guides our actions 
(in this case, maybe make the visitor welcome)2. There is, she says, a 
connection between the underlying maxim and the (set of) intentions 
that we have, insofar as it would be impossible to accomplish the end 
of our maxim if we do not preserve the mutual consistency of our 
intentions. So the intentions are, in a sense, “derived” or “secondary” 
with respect to the maxim that we have; but still necessary. Moreover, 
the ways in which the maxims can be enacted or realized can vary 
with respect to the situation or the context in which the individual is 
situated; and according to the culture in which he is. So, to continue 
with the coffee example, choosing the kind of coffee that the guest 
will drink could be the best way to make the visitor welcome in some 
cultures, but to make him choose the coffee could be the best way in 
others. In both cases the underlying maxim is the same (make him 
feel well) but the intentions through which we realize it are different 
(choosing his coffee and making him choose, respectively).
I think that; instead of considering coordination/timing cases 
as potential problems for one interpretation of the Categorical 
2 O’Neill’s argumentation becomes a bit confusing at this point, because in some parts 
of the text she suggests that what is fundamental is the underlying principle, while 
in others she suggests that what is fundamental is the relevant intention. In any case, 
her point is clear enough: what is most important is the relevant maxim that underlie 
our actions.
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Imperative, or as cases which reinforce the interpretation of the other, 
we could simply understand them as intentions which are second-
ary with respect to a maxim. In order to elucidate what the relevant 
maxim is, and what the secondary intentions are, we should analyze 
the particular situation at hand. There is not anything that could be 
said a priori about them. So, for example, the case of the person who 
goes to the after-Christmas sale could simply be understood as an 
example of somebody who is acting on the maxim of taking advan-
tage of the benefits of the market economy, and realizes that maxim 
by shopping in the after-Christmas sale that day only. There does not 
seem to be any inconsistency in enjoying the benefits of the economy. 
In fact, that is what everybody seems to do. It is important to note 
here the difference between the general maxim “enjoying the benefits 
of the market economy” and the particular intention of “shopping in 
the after-Christmas sale”. If we differentiate one from the other, I think 
that there are reasonable grounds to understand that specific coordi-
nation case as universalizable. Something similar could be said about 
the case of the neighbour who uses the tennis court Sunday morning 
because everybody else is at church. That person could be simply acting 
on the maxim of preserving a good relationship with the neighbours 
(and therefore waits until nobody uses the court to use it) or on the 
maxim of maintaining a healthy body by following the doctor’s advice 
of running only from 10 to 10:30. In any case, the fact that the person 
uses the tennis court at that particular moment to play is just an inten-
tion, ancillary to the underlying relevant maxim. This does not mean, 
of course, that any intention is valid as long as it realizes the maxim. 
The assumption here is simply that intentions and relevant maxims 
should be consistent with each other, and with the others’ maxims and 
intentions. As O’Neill puts it, 
The universality test discussed here is, above all, a test of the mu-
tual consistency of (sets of) intentions and universalized intentions or 
principles. It operates by showing some sets of proposed intentions to 
be mutually inconsistent. It does not thereby generally single out action 
on any one set of specific intentions as morally required. (O’Neill 103)
Understood under this perspective, neither the case of the after 
Christmas sale nor the case of the person who uses the tennis court 
are clear cases of inconsistencies. 
If the preceding analysis is correct, then Herman’s cases are not 
really strong counterexamples to the practical interpretation, because 
there does not seem to be any good reason to think that the practi-
cal interpretation would have to reject cases like those. In fact, the 
after-Christmas sale and the tennis court case are not necessarily 
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contradictory when universalized, so the unpleasant outcome that the 
practical interpretation inevitably leads to reject cases such as these 
does not seem to follow.
Going back to the comparison of the different interpretations and 
the problems that each of them have, I do not see any strong reason 
why, overall, the logical interpretation should be stronger than the 
practical one, as Herman suggests. Moreover, the practical interpreta-
tion not only does not seem to have the problems that Herman claims 
it has. but also seems to have important advantages over the concep-
tual one. In fact, it rejects cases of free riding (and, in general, any case 
in which an immoral omission is involved), but it does not necessar-
ily reject cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, 
on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not 
reject cases of free riding (i.e. immoral cases of free riding), and to the 
desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/tim-
ing. But the desired outcome of not rejecting maxims of coordination/
timing is something that, as we saw, we also obtain through the practi-
cal interpretation; so, in that sense, they are not substantially different.
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